The line IAS 29 refused to draw
Updated: 3 days ago
IAS 29 refuses to set a rate at which hyperinflation begins. US GAAP sets one: 100% over three years. Was the IASC right to leave it to judgement, and does that reason still hold?

Every December, groups with operations in Lagos, Accra, Istanbul or Juba ask the same question: is this currency hyperinflationary yet? The answer decides whether a subsidiary's financial statements are restated into current purchasing power, retrospectively and as if the economy had always been hyperinflationary. Under IFRS, the answer is a judgement.
US GAAP has a number. IFRS has five indicators, and the number is only the last of them. This column asks why, and whether the design still earns its keep.
What the rule says
IAS 29 applies to any entity whose functional currency is the currency of a hyperinflationary economy (IAS 29.1). Its premise is that unrestated figures are then not useful: money loses value so fast that comparing amounts from different dates, even within one period, misleads (IAS 29.2).
IAS 29.3 then declines to define the condition. The Standard "does not establish an absolute rate at which hyperinflation is deemed to arise", and when restatement becomes necessary "is a matter of judgement". The indicators it lists "include, but are not limited to":
people keep their wealth in non-monetary assets or a stable foreign currency;
people think in a stable foreign currency, and prices may be quoted in it;
credit prices compensate for the expected loss of purchasing power;
interest rates, wages and prices are linked to a price index; and
cumulative inflation over three years is approaching, or exceeds, 100%.
IAS 29.4 adds the only nod to consistency: it is "preferable" that all entities reporting in the same currency apply the Standard from the same date. The next sentence undercuts it: the Standard applies to any entity from the beginning of the period in which that entity identifies hyperinflation.
The dig: an empty trench
Here there is almost nothing to excavate. The IASC issued IAS 29 in July 1989, operative for periods beginning on or after 1 January 1990 (IAS 29.41). It came without a Basis for Conclusions, and the IASB adopted it as it stood in April 2001. The Basis that now accompanies it runs to two paragraphs, both about a 2008 wording change to paragraph 6 (IAS 29.BC1–BC2). Nothing explains paragraph 3, a gap stakeholders raised with the IASB in its January 2025 feedback summary.
So the reasoning has to be read from the text. Paragraphs 2 and 3 describe a functional test. The first four indicators are about behaviour: whether people still save, price and contract in the local currency. Hyperinflation, on this reading, is the point at which money stops working as a unit of account, and the 100% figure is evidence of that, not its definition. Even the number is hedged: "approaching, or exceeds".
IFRIC 7, issued in November 2005, did not reopen the question. It requires first-year restatement as if the economy had always been hyperinflationary (IFRIC 7.3), and says in a footnote only that identification rests on the entity's judgement of the IAS 29.3 criteria.
US GAAP starts from the number. Above 100% over three years, the economy is highly inflationary "in all instances"; below it, trends and other factors are weighed (ASC 830-10-45-12). The Codification admits the definition is "necessarily an arbitrary decision" (ASC 830-10-45-13). Its consequence is also lighter: the foreign entity is remeasured as if its functional currency were the parent's reporting currency (ASC 830-10-45-11), not restated in constant purchasing power.
What has changed since
Latin American standard-setters asked the IASB to cut the indicator to 26% over three years, about 8% a year. The IASB declined in April 2015. The staff paper summarised the investors on its Capital Markets Advisory Committee: IAS 29 is for an economy in major upheaval, where the currency is effectively irrelevant, and "the test must be very high" (AP14, April 2015, paragraph 26). In 2016 the IASB put a narrow feasibility study on the scope of IAS 29 in its research pipeline. The project page still lists it, with no meeting since March 2019.
In June 2025 the IFRS Interpretations Committee finalised an agenda decision on assessing the indicators. It found little diversity in understanding: stakeholders do not conclude on one indicator alone, consider others when relevant, and do not reach different answers at different levels of a group on the same basis of preparation. But, the agenda decision says, they "might assign different weights" to the indicators; the Committee observed that this might lead them to different conclusions about the same economy (AP12A, July 2025, paragraph 11).
Earlier that year IASB staff had listed stakeholders' fixes: make 100% a rebuttable presumption, make it a bright line, delete it, or add forward-looking indicators. No decision followed. In September 2026 hyperinflation was still a topic flagged for attention, ahead of an agenda consultation planned for 2027.
Does the reason still hold?
The test of the IASC's design is its own stated aim in IAS 29.4: the same economy, the same date. Recent practice falls short of it.
Economy | One view | Another view |
|---|---|---|
Türkiye | Apr 2022 | Dec 2023 |
Ghana | Dec 2023 | Not in 2023 |
South Sudan | 2011 | Dec 2024 |
Sierra Leone exit | Mar 2026 | Jun 2026 |
KPMG treats Türkiye as hyperinflationary from periods ending 30 April 2022; PwC said in April 2022 that Türkiye was expected to be hyperinflationary for periods ending on or after 30 June 2022. Türkiye's Public Oversight Authority announced on 23 November 2023 that local reporters should apply it from annual periods ending on or after 31 December 2023. For about eighteen months, a Turkish subsidiary could be hyperinflationary in its parent's consolidation and not in its own statutory accounts.
In Ghana the split was open. According to the Institute of Chartered Accountants, Ghana (ICAG), the Big Four firms had recommended applying IAS 29 for December 2023. In January 2024 ICAG directed its members not to apply IAS 29 to 2023 financial statements, warning that non-compliance "would attract appropriate sanctions".
The firms also differ among themselves. EY says South Sudan has been considered hyperinflationary since 2011; KPMG's list starts from periods ending 31 December 2024. On the way out, EY regards Burundi and Sierra Leone as having ceased by 31 March 2026, and PwC for periods ending on or after 30 June 2026. KPMG's May 2026 list mentions neither.
The number and the judgement also part company. The Center for Audit Quality International Practices Task Force (IPTF) discussion document showed Nigeria above 100% at December 2024 on IMF data, and Deloitte's view was that Nigeria was highly inflationary under US GAAP as of September 2024, with highly inflationary accounting from 1 October 2024. Neither EY's April 2026 list nor PwC's May 2026 list treats Nigeria as hyperinflationary under IFRS.
Some of this is legitimate judgement: ICAG found the qualitative indicators absent or not widespread, and Standard Bank, presenting to the IASB's advisory forum in July 2025, cited falling inflation and a steadier cedi. But the cost is real. Because IFRIC 7 requires restatement as if the economy had always been hyperinflationary, the gap is not a timing nuisance. Two sets of statements for the same company, audited under the same Standards, carry different asset values and different profits for years.
A bright line would not have cured all of it. When Argentina crossed in 2018, the answer depended on the index: Deloitte reported blended consumer price measures above 100% since late 2017, while the wholesale index reached about 109% only in May 2018. A threshold moves the judgement to the data. In South Sudan, the IPTF notes, there is no reliable local data at all.
Verdict
The IASC's reason holds for the condition it describes. Hyperinflation is an economic state, not a number, and a pure line would sweep in one-off spikes and stale estimates while triggering one of the heaviest restatements in IFRS. US GAAP can afford an arbitrary line because its consequence is lighter.
What does not hold is the drafting around the judgement. IAS 29.4 states a preference for one date and supplies no mechanism to reach it, and thirty-seven years of practice show the preference is not enough. The better design is a rebuttable presumption: 100% over three years means hyperinflationary, unless the entity can show the other indicators are absent. It should work in both directions, so that a fall below 100% creates a presumption of exit. Some stakeholders told the IASB this would change little in practice. It would change who has to prove what, and, with a required disclosure of the date and its basis, make disagreements visible. Our verdict: keep the judgement, but make the number carry the burden of proof.
What it means for December 2026
Assess each functional currency against IAS 29.3, not just a firm's list, and keep the evidence on the qualitative indicators.
Watch the borderline cases: Nigeria and Egypt on entry; Burundi and Sierra Leone, which have just exited; and, still treated as hyperinflationary but nearing the line, Haiti (central bank three-year rate 93% at February 2026) and Malawi (IMF projection about 100% for 2026).
Align group and subsidiary conclusions, and explain any local regulatory difference.
Disclose the judgement where it is significant (IAS 1.122).
IAS 29 trusted the profession to recognise hyperinflation when it saw it. The profession does see it; it just does not agree on the date.
Dig further
IAS 29 in the Learning Hub: restatement, the net monetary position and the indicators.
Hyperinflation Watch: the economies the firms list today, with their dates and where they differ.
Suggest a question for a future Basis Archaeology dig.
References are to IFRS Accounting Standards as issued by the IASB.





